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VOLUME 69 SUMMER 2004 NUMBER 3
A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal
for an American Works Councils Act
Stephen F. Befort"
INTRODUCTION
After decades of ossification,' the prospects for meaningful labor law re-
form appeared possibly to be within grasp in the early 1990s. With the
Democratic Party in control of both houses of Congress as well as of the
White House, President Clinton, in 1993, charged the Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations with the task of examining the need
for labor and employment law reform. Commonly referred to by the name of
the committee's chair,2 the Dunlop Commission issued a fact finding report in
1994,3 and, after receiving considerable input, issued its final report and rec-
* Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, and Bennett Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Anne Johnson for editorial assistance.
1. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REv. 1527, 1530 (2002) (stating "[tihe core of American labor law has
been essentially sealed off-to a remarkably complete extent and for a remarkably
long time-both from democratic revision and renewal and from local experimenta-
tion and innovation. The basic statutory language, and many of the intermediate level
principles and procedures through which the essentials of self-organization and col-
lective bargaining are put into practice, have been nearly frozen, or ossified, for over
fifty years.").
2. Former Secretary of Labor John T. Dunlop served as the Commission's
Chair.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE
FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT FINDING REPORT (1994) [here-
inafter FACT FINDING REPORT].
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ommendations later that same year.4 But, with the Republican Party's sweep
of the 1994 Congressional races, the report was dead upon arrival.5
One significant piece of data generated by the Dunlop Commission,
however, continues to stir debate. Professors Richard Freeman and Joel
Rogers undertook a massive survey of American employees with respect to
their attitudes toward workplace relationships. In this "mother of all work-
place surveys," 6 Freeman and Rogers interviewed and re-interviewed more
than 2400 workers. 7 The results of the Worker Representation and Participa-
tion Survey first were summarized as an appendix to the Dunlop Commission
report, and then expanded upon in the recent book, What Workers Want.9
Freeman and Rogers document a large "representation/participation gap"
between the influence that employees want at work and the influence they
currently possess.'0 The authors summarized their principal findings as fol-
lows:
American workers want more involvement and greater say in their
jobs; they would like this involvement to take the form of joint
committees with management and would prefer to elect members
of those committees rather than have managers select them. They
prefer cooperative committees to potentially conflictual organized
relationships. A sizable minority are in workplaces where they and
their fellow workers want to be represented by unions or union-like
organizations. I
When asked to select a single most preferable type of workplace
organization, a majority of the surveyed employees chose a joint employee-
management committee that discusses and resolves workplace issues." As
the authors point out, this is "an institutional form that does not effectively
exist in the United States."'
' 3
4. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE
FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1994) [hereinafter REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS].
5. See WALTER GALENSON, THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 1955-1995, at
79 (1996); Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Introduction: Worker Representation
... Again!, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 375, 377 (2001).
6. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 16 (1999).
7. Id. at 31-38.
8. REPORT ON FuTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 4, at
app. A.
9. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 6.
10. Id. at 4.
11. REPORT ON FuTuRE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 4, at
app. A.
12. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 6, at 151-52.
13. Id. at 152.
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What American workers want, in short, is more "voice" in the work-
place. The concept of "voice" in the employment context refers to the ability
of workers to communicate viewpoints, complaints, and desires to their em-
ployers in a meaningful way.' 4 This voice is beneficial in terms of enhancing
individual dignity, employee satisfaction, workplace productivity, and civic
responsibility.
For the past century, unions have served as the principle voice mecha-
nism for workers in the United States. With the decline of unions, employee
voice also has diminished. Federal labor law compounds this problem by
serving as a significant obstacle to the creation of many alternative mecha-
nisms for employee participation. Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act bars such mechanisms to the extent that they involve employer-
supported programs by which employees "deal[] with" employers concerning
terms and conditions of employment.'
5
The fact that employees want additional voice at work, by itself, does
not mean that the law necessarily should compel or facilitate such a result.
To paraphrase Mick Jagger, American workers can't always get what they
want.16 The strong preference of America's muted workforce, however, does
warrant a close examination of how national labor policy should address the
matter of employee voice. This article attempts such an examination.
Both the East and the West offer possible alternative voice mechanisms.
So far, most attention has focused on Japanese employer-initiated employee
participation practices. Over the past two decades, American employers in-
creasingly have adopted quality circles, work teams, total quality manage-
ment, and other employee involvement programs. 17 But the growth in these
programs has fallen short of expectations due, in part, to the reluctance of
some employers to cede managerial discretion and, in part, to the continuing
limits imposed by Section 8(a)(2). Thus far, attempts either to amend or re-
peal that section have failed.
Europe provides a different alternative model in the form of works
councils. "Works councils are elected bodies of employees who meet regu-
larly with management to discuss establishment level problems."', Most
countries in Western Europe legislatively mandate the formation of works
councils for enterprises or plants in excess of a certain minimum size. In
addition, works councils are undergoing a continent-wide boom as the ex-
panding European Union has adopted a series of directives that require a near
universal establishment of works councils over the next few years. For a
14. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
15. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(2) and 152(5)
(2000).
16. THE ROLLING STONES, You Can't Always Get What You Want, on LET IT
BLEED (ABKCO Records 1969).
17. See infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
18. FAcT FINDING REPORT, supra note 3, at 43.
2004]
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number of reasons discussed below, a works councils model provides the best
option for reinvigorating employee voice in the United States.
Part I of this Article introduces the notion of voice and summarizes the
benefits of employee voice in the workplace. Part II provides an overview of
how unions amplify employee voice and chronicles the decline of the Ameri-
can labor movement. In Part III, the Article explores various alternative
voice mechanisms with particular reference to management-initiated em-
ployee participation programs borrowed from Japan. Part IV analyzes Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) and discusses how that provision serves as a limitation on certain
types of employee participation practices. Part V reviews various proposals
that have been suggested as a means to reform the NLRA in order to increase
employee voice. Part VI of the Article then tacks in a different direction and
describes the functions and growth of works councils in Europe. Finally, Part
VII proposes the framework for a new American Works Councils Act and
discusses the potential advantages and disadvantages of such a system.
I. THE BENEFITS OF VOICE IN THE WORKPLACE
In a seminal book fusing economic and political analysis, Albert 0.
Hirschman articulated the role of "voice" in a relational context. 19 According
to Hirschman, individuals who are unhappy in some aspect of a relationship
with a firm or an organization may express their displeasure through either of
two optional responses. 20 One possible response is for the individual to exit
the relationship by simply ceasing to deal with that particular firm or organi-
zation.21 The individual, alternatively, may give voice to his or her displeas-
22
ure by communicating with the firm or organization. Hirschman defined
"voice" in this context as:
any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objec-
tionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective
petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a
higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in manage-
ment, or through various types of actions and protests, including
those that are meant to mobilize public opinion.
23
Hirschman further postulated that an individual's choice between these
two options is influenced by the individual's degree of loyalty to the firm or
19. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
20. See id. at 4.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 30.
[Vol. 69
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organization. He noted that, in general, loyalty serves to activate the voice
option and makes exit less likely.
2R
Professors Freeman and Medoff have transposed Hirschman's model to
the employment arena. 25 They note that an employee who is displeased with
an employer's labor policies may either quit the job or attempt to change the
policies in question.26 In this context, "voice means discussing with an em-
ployer conditions that ought to be changed, rather than quitting the job."27 In
short, the notion of employee voice connotes some participatory process in
which employees have input on matters of workplace decision-making.
A considerable body of scholarly literature touts the benefits of enabling
employee participation by means of addressing matters of workplace concern.
These proponents of employee participation tend to fall into two broad
camps. The first group contends that employee voice mechanisms boost the
economic performance of the firm. This enhanced performance purportedly
occurs for several reasons. First, employee participation fosters an increased
flow of information in the workplace. This information aids in better prob-
lem solving and in the creative design of workplace systems.29 This im-
proved information flow also may facilitate better coordination among pro-
duction functions.
30
Many commentators additionally believe that employee participation
boosts employee motivation to perform well at work. By having a say in
workplace decisions, employees are more likely to buy into the firm's proc-
esses and objectives. 31 In short, a worker who perceives herself as valued is
more likely to be a productive worker.
32
Finally, echoing Hirschman, 33 a number of scholars see a positive corre-
lation between employee participation, job satisfaction, loyalty, and job ten-
24. See id. at 77-78.
25. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984).
26. See id. at 8.
27. Id.
28. See EDWARD E. LAWLER III, HIGH-INVOLVEMENT MANAGEMENT:
PARTICIPATIVE STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 35-37
(1986); DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: How BUSINESS AND
EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN 38 (1995); Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who
Speaks for Us? Employee Representation in a Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13, 17-20 (Bruce E.
Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993).
29. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 15; LAWLER, supra note 28, at
33-37.
30. See LAWLER, supra note 28, at 33-37.
31. See id. at 28-32; LEVINE, supra note 28, at 38.
32. See LAWLER, supra note 28, at 29-32.
33. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19, at 77-78.
2004]
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ure.34 The latter factor, in turn, reduces the costs associated with the hiring
and training of new employees and provides an incentive for investment in
enterprise-specific skills.
35
Numerous studies have attempted to gauge the impact of employee par-
ticipation programs on productivity. Although the empirical findings of these
studies are mixed, most find that employee involvement generally enhances
the economic productivity of the firm. 36 Levin and Tyson, for example, re-
ported that their analysis of forty-three empirical studies revealed "usually a
positive, often small, effect of participation on productivity ... and almost
never a negative effect." 37 Similarly, Freeman and Rogers stated that their
review of the relevant empirical data supports the conclusion that employee
participation raises productivity in the range of two to five percent. 38 Pro-
ductivity gains tend to be most pronounced with respect to participation
mechanisms that remain in place over time and that are integrated systemi-
cally with other innovative management practices.
39
The second group of proponents tends to urge greater employee in-
volvement in workplace decisions on participatory democracy grounds. This
non-economic justification for employee participation proceeds on two levels.
On the enterprise level, employee participation purportedly enhances an em-
ployee's sense of efficacy over his or her work environment. 40 This democ-
ratic empowerment serves basic notions of human dignity and autonomy.4'
34. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 14; LAWLER, supra note 28, at
32-33; Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 19.
35. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 14.
36. See, e.g., FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 6, at 103-05; LEVINE, supra note
28, at 80-81; Brian Becker & Barry Gerhart, The Impact of Human Resource Man-
agement on Organizational Performance: Progress and Prospects, 39 ACAD. MGMT.
J. 779 (1996); Casey Ichniowski et al., What Works at Work: Overview and Assess-
ment, 35 INDUS. REL. 299 (1996).
37. David I. Levine and Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and
the Firm's Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE
203-04 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990).
38. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 6, at 105.
39. See FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 3, at 46. See also Takao Kato & Mo-
tohiro Morishima, The Productivity Effects of Participatory Employment Practices:
Evidence from New Japanese Panel Data, 41 INDUS. REL. 487, 516-17 (2002) (report-
ing econometric findings that an employer's use of complementary employee partici-
pation practices can lead to eight to nine percent increases in productivity if continued
over a long gestation period of approximately seven years).
40. See JOHN L. COTTON, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT: METHODS FOR IMPROVING
PERFORMANCE AND WORK ATTITUDES 17 (1993); S. LANCE DENNING, THE PRACTICE
OF WORKPLACE PARTICIPATION: MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS AT THREE
PARTICIPATORY FIRMS 2-3 (1998); Marshall Sashkin, Participative Management is an
Ethical Imperative, 12 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 5 (1984).
41. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Prod-
uct Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3, 21 (1993); Patricia A. Greenfield & Robert J.
(Vol. 69
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On a broader scale, participatory theorists posit that individuals who become
actively engaged in the workplace will carry over this participatory behavior
into larger social and political arenas in the community.42 While the church
or the town meeting may have played this role in the past, advocates of par-
ticipatory democracy now see the modem workplace as offering the most
effective training ground for the skills and attitudes necessary for civic en-
gagement.43 Robert Dahl has aptly summarized the participatory democracy
line of reasoning as follows:
Workplace democracy, it is sometimes claimed, will foster human
development, enhance the sense of political efficacy, reduce alien-
ation, create a solidary community based on work, strengthen at-
tachments to the general good of the community, weaken the pull
of self-interest, produce a body of active and concerned public-
spirited citizens within the enterprises, and stimulate greater par-
ticipation and better citizenship in the government of the state it-
self."
II. THE MUFFLED STATE OF VOICE IN AMERICA'S WORKPLACES
Labor unions constituted the principal voice mechanism for American
workers during the twentieth century. 5 The decline in union density during
the second half of that century" has carried with it an overall diminution of
employee voice. Thus far, increases in governmental regulation and em-
ployer-sponsored participation programs have not made up for this loss.
Pleasure, Representatives of Their Own Choosing: Finding Workers' Voice in the
Legitimacy and Power of Their Unions, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note
28, at 169, 173.
42. See PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE
103-04 (1967); C. B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
104 (1977); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 42-43
(1970).
43. BACHRACH, supra note 42, at 103.
44. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 95 (1985).
45. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 8 ("In modem industrial econo-
mies, and particularly in large enterprises, a trade union is the vehicle for collective
voice-that is, for providing workers as a group with a means of communicating with
management."); Clyde W. Summers, Questioning the Unquestioned in Collective
Labor Law, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 791, 808 (1998) ("It is through collective bargaining
that employees have a voice in the decisions that affect their working lives...
46. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
20041
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A. Union Voice
Using the mid-century mark as a reference point, the legal framework
applicable to the American workforce in 1950 divided into two distinct sec-
tors. The larger at-will sector covered approximately two-thirds of the work-
force. 47 In this union-free zone, employers were free to hire and fire employ-
ees for any reason.48 Governmental regulation was virtually non-existent
except for the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act.49 Employers in this climate were free to set terms and
conditions of employment unilaterally with no compulsion to consult with
any collective employee voice. And, with firms organized in the hierarchical
style urged by Frederick Winslow Taylor,50 American employers typically
neither sought nor gave weight to the suggestions of individual employees.
51
The unionized sector accounted for the remaining portion of the work-
force. In 1950, union members accounted for 31.5 percent of the American
47. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A
Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv. 351, 355-57 (2002).
48. The Tennessee Supreme Court articulated a classic description of the at-will
rule in a 1884 decision. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), over-
ruled by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915) (stating "[a]ll [employers]
may dismiss their employes [sic] at-will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no
cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong").
For a good description of the development and historical antecedents of the employ-
ment-at-will rule, see generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment
at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000). Enacted in 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act
requires employers to pay covered employees the equivalent of a mandated minimum
hourly wage plus overtime compensation at one and one-half times the regular rate of
pay for time worked in excess of 40 hours per week. In 1950, the minimum wage was
pegged at seventy-five cents per hour. See The Federal Hourly Minimum Wage Since
its Inception, available at http://www.cnn.com/US/9608/20/minimum.wage.sign/grap
h_mimimum.wage.gif (last visited May 30, 2004).
50. FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
(1911). Under the Taylorist model, which came to dominate American business or-
ganizations in the early twentieth century, rank and file employees were assigned
specialized and standardized tasks which eventually led to the assembly line mode of
production. See generally DANIEL NELSON, FREDERICK W. TAYLOR AND THE RISE OF
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1980).
51. See LAWLER, supra note 28, at 5-6 ("Authority and decision making were
supposed to rest at the top while the lower-level participants were asked to focus on
doing, not thinking. Thinking, coordinating, and controlling were left to manage-
ment."); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 196 (1990) ("Under ... scientific management, there was a
sharp divide between the small elite management team that decided what and how the
work was to be done, and the large mass of labor that simply did what it was told.").
[Vol. 69
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nonagricultural workforce.52 In sharp contrast to the at-will sector, employers
and unions in the unionized sector are required to engage in a bilateral proc-
ess in an attempt to establish terms and conditions of employment.
As part of this bilateral process, unions empower employee voice in
three related, but different ways. First, the NLRA guarantees the right of
employees to bargain collectively through their selected union representa-
tive.53 Mandatory subjects of bargaining include "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, '5 4 but not matters that go to the core of
an employer's entrepreneurial control" such as plant closings56 and product
advertising. 57 The NLRA obligates both parties to negotiate in "good faith"58
with a present intention to find a basis for agreement,59 although "such obli-
gation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the mak-
ing of a concession."
'
Second, the NLRA protects the right of employees to engage in "con-
certed activit[y] for ... mutual aid or protection. '  This includes a ban on an
52. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs 1980b, at 412 tbl.165,
reprinted in MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE
UNITED STATES 10, tbl.1 (1987). Approximately fifteen million American workers
belonged to unions in 1950. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, D 927-939 (Bicentennial ed.
1975). Of these, approximately eight and one-half million were members of the
American Federation of Labor (AFL), four million belonged to the Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations (CIO), and the remaining two and one-half million were members
of independent or unaffiliated organizations. See id.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). A union generally attains representational status
only after first establishing its majority status among the employees in a representa-
tional election. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Upon attaining such status, the union serves
as the exclusive representative of all employees in that bargaining unit. Id.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
55. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that the NLRA does not require bargaining with
regard to managerial decisions "which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control").
56. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (rul-
ing that an employer is not required to bargain with respect to a decision to close part
of its business operation).
57. See, e.g., NLRB v. Detroit Resilient Floor Decorators Local Union No. 2265,
317 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1963) (ruling that an employer is not required to bargain with
respect to deciding whether to contribute to an industry promotion fund).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
59. See NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960);
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1943).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 157. See also 29 U.S.C. § 163 ("Nothing in this subchapter...
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike .... ).
2004]
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employer's ability to discharge62 or otherwise retaliate63 against an employee
who participates in a lawful strike, boycott, or picket.
Finally, collective bargaining agreements negotiated pursuant to the
NLRA may themselves provide an additional voice mechanism. The vast
majority of such agreements establish a grievance procedure culminating in
binding arbitration to resolve contract interpretation and application disputes
that may arise during the life of a collective agreement.
64
In short, unionization, at least where it succeeds, is a powerful mecha-
nism for activating and amplifying employee voice. As the next section de-
tails, however, unions have succeeded less and less since 1950.
B. The Decline of Union Voice
1. The Numbers
Union membership in the United States peaked in 1954 at 34.7 percent
of the nonagricultural labor force 65 and then began a long and steady decline.
Union density dropped to 24.7 percent in 197066 and continued downward to
16.1 percent in 1990. 67 The decline has slowed but not stopped as the most
recently available data in 2003 shows union membership at 12.9 percent of
the nonagricultural labor force.68
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3); NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 700 F.2d 385
(7th Cir. 1983).
63. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (employer
committed unfair labor practice by paying accrued vacation benefits to all qualifying
employees except those who participated in lawful strike).
64. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2013, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, JULY 1, 1976, at 82 (1979) (reporting that
approximately 96 percent of agreements in effect during July 1976 in the nation's
most important industries provided for arbitration as the terminal point of the contrac-
tual grievance process). Most contracts also provide for a "just cause" limitation on
employee discipline and discharge. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward
a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 594
n. 1 (ninety-four percent of collective bargaining agreements entered into under the
NLRA contain clauses that provide that an employer may discharge employees only
with "just cause") (citing 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND
CONTRACTS (BNA) § 40:1 (1983)). Taken together, this means that employers may
discharge employees covered by most union contracts only upon convincing a neutral
arbitrator that just cause exists to support the termination decision.
65. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 52, at 10 tbl.1.
66. See id. at 11 tbl.2.
67. See 26 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-8 (Feb. 7, 1991).
68. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Union Members in 2003 (Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.releas
e/pdf/union2.pdf The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports a total of 15.8 million union
members in the United States in 2003. See id.
(Vol. 69
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The actual drop in private sector union membership is even more severe
once the simultaneous rise in public sector unionism is considered. In 1950,
union membership among public employees was negligible. During the dec-
ades of the 1960s and 1970s, public sector union density grew five-fold69 and
thirty-six states enacted labor relations statutes protecting public employee
bargaining rights. 70 By 2000, 37.5 percent of all government workers were
union members, accounting for approximately 40 percent of total union
membership.7 ' Once this public sector boom is factored out, union members
comprise only nine percent of the current private sector labor force.72
2. The Reasons
In a recent article, I discussed six factors that have contributed to the de-
cline of the American labor movement. They are: (1) the new global econ-
omy; (2) employer opposition to unions and deficiencies in the NLRA's regu-
latory structure; (3) changing workforce composition; (4) the increase in con-
tingent work; (5) the nature of American unionism; and (6) American rugged
individualism.73 While each factor has played a role, the first two are particu-
larly significant.
a. The Global Economy
Advances in technology and transportation have created a global econ-
omy in which American firms must compete on an international basis.
74
69. In 1956, only 915,000 federal, state, and local governmental employees were
union members. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN
1865, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1975, at 382 tbl.155 (1975). By 1980, more
than five million public employees belonged to unions. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & LABOR-MANAGEMENT SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, No. 102, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: 1980, 1 tbl B (1981).
70. See DONALD H. WOLLETT ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT 9-11 (4th ed. 1993).
71. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
Union Members in 2000 (Jan. 18, 2001), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.releas
e/History/union2.01182001.news.
72. See id.
73. See Befort, supra note 47, at 362-77.
74. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE?: THE REJUVENATION OF
THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 42-47 (1993) (describing the rise of the global
economy); WILLIAM B. JOHNSTON & ARNOLD E. PACKER, HUDSON INSTITUTE,
WORKFORCE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1-5
(1987) [hereinafter WORKFORCE 2000] (depicting the development of an integrated
world economy since the 1960's); FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 3, at 2-3 (re-
porting that the ratio of exports and imports to gross domestic product for the United
States more than doubled between 1960 and 1991).
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Given the lower wage structures of most developing nations,75 American
unions now face intense resistance in virtually every sector in which interna-
tional production is feasible.
76
This pressure has lead to lower union density rates in two related ways.
First, trade and technology have made capital more mobile." Modem ad-
vances in information and communication technologies, in particular, have
enabled employers to produce goods wherever labor costs are the most attrac-
tive.78 American employers, accordingly, have shifted production to the Sun-
belt79 and to developing nations as a means of lowering labor costs and escap-
ing unions.8
0
Second, American firms, whether or not they relocate operations, face
intense pressure to cut costs in order to compete in the new global economy.
8 1
75. See CRAVER, supra note 74, 43-47; INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY 77 (1973).
76. See Estreicher, supra note 41, at 13 n. 33 (noting that "[tihe impact of inter-
national product market competition has been principally felt in the manufacturing
sector-in particular, the clothing, steel, automobile, rubber, and electronics indus-
tries"). The fact that public sector governmental services are less susceptible to pro-
duction on an international basis may help explain the greater degree of success that
unions have achieved in that sector.
77. See generally ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING
OURSELVES FOR 21st CENTURY CAPITALISM 113-22, 263-64 (1991) (describing the
significant mobility of capital in the new global economy); BEVERLY J. SILVER,
FORCES OF LABOR: WORKERS' MOVEMENTS AND GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1870, at 3-4
(2003) (summarizing various studies discussing the "hypernobility" of capital);
Janice R. Bellace, Labor Law for the Post-Industrial Workplace: Breaking the New
Deal Model in the USA, in LABOUR LAW AT THE CROSSROADS: CHANGING
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 22 (J.R. Bellace & M.G. Rood eds., 1997) (noting the
greater mobility of capital as compared to labor in the global economy).
78. See R. Blanpain, The Changing World of Work, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 23, 24-26
(R. Blanpain & C. Engels eds., 6th ed. 1998) (describing the impact of technology on
the global movement of goods and services); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment
in the New Age of Trade and Technology: Implications for Labor and Employment
Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 1-2, 11 (2000) (same).
79. See SANFORD M. JACOBY, MODERN MANORS: WELFARE CAPITALISM SINCE
THE NEW DEAL 255-56 (1997) (describing the relocation of manufacturing operations
to southern states); see also THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 66-68 (1986) (describing the influence of labor
costs and union avoidance on plant location decisions).
80. See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 42-47 (describing the flight of American busi-
ness to a "foreign production platform"); Bellace, supra note 77, at 22 (noting that the
global marketplace entices American businesses to move production facilities to
lower wage countries).
81. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 78, at 2, 12 (describing how global competition
has led to a "new flexibility" in structuring work arrangements).
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Since unionization tends to come with a sizeable wage premium,82 union
avoidance and resistance to union wage demands have become a prime busi-
ness strategy.8 3 Less directly, American businesses, particularly beginning in
the 1980s, have turned to reorganization, down-sizing, and contingent work
arrangements as cost-cutting measures.8 4 These measures destabilize long-
term work arrangements and are inimical to union strength. 85
b. Employer Opposition and NLRA Regulatory Structure
A unique attribute of the American system of labor-relations is the ac-
tive opposition of many American employers to union organizing efforts.
8 6
Much of this opposition is made possible by the NLRA's adoption of an elec-
toral model for determining representational status.8 7 In many other industri-
alized countries, an employer automatically must bargain with a union con-
ceming the rights of its members. 8 Under such a system, employers play no
overt role in an employee's decision to join a union, and any opposition to
union demands typically does not occur until the parties meet at the bargain-
ing table.89 Under the NLRA, in contrast, an employer is not obligated to
bargain until after a union first establishes its majority status in a representa-
tion election.9° U.S. employers, moreover, may participate actively in this
82. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 46, 64 (describing a 20 to 30
percent union wage effect).
83. See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 107-08 (describing the financial incen-
tive for American business to avoid unions).
84. See PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK 66-88 (1997) (describing
various changes in business practices beginning in the early 1980s).
85. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 221-45; Dau-Schmidt, supra
note 78, at 20.
86. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 45 (1993) ("The fact is that American
employers have never accepted trade unionism to the extent that their counterparts
have in other industrialized countries throughout the world, a phenomenon sometimes
encapsulated by the term 'American exceptionalism.'").
87. See FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 3, at 75 ("The United States is the
only major democratic country in which the choice of whether or not workers are to
be represented by a union is subject to such a confrontational process....").
88. See, e.g., Richard E. Lutringer & Mark S. Dichter, Germany, in I
INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 4-1, 4-40 to 4-41 (William L. Keller
& Timothy J. Darby eds., 2nd ed. 2003) (Germany); Stephen F. Befort & Virginia E.
Comett, Beyond the Rhetoric of the NAFTA Treaty Debate: A Comparative Analysis
of Labor and Employment Law in Mexico and the United States, 17 CoMP. LAB. L. J.
269, 289 (1996) (Mexico).
89. See Roy J. Adams, The Right to Participate, 5 EMPLOYEE RESPS. & RTS. J.
91, 94 (1992) ("Few advanced democratic societies condone open opposition by em-
ployers to unionization.").
90. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000).
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election process. The NLRA permits an employer to express its opposition to
union representation so long as it does not engage in threats of reprisal for
union support or make promises of benefits to entice union opposition.
9 1
Many employers hire professional consultants for the purpose of orchestrat-
ing sophisticated anti-union campaigns.92 These campaigns not infrequently
spill over to include illegal tactics such as the discharge of union supporters,
93
which go undeterred by the tepid remedies of the NLRA. A number of em-
pirical studies show that these anti-union tactics often are successful in influ-
encing election outcomes.
95
The weakness of the NLRA's regulatory structure also encourages em-
ployers to continue to oppose unions even if the latter successfully has run the
election gauntlet. American employers often dispense with union representa-
tives by refusing to bargain in good faith for an initial contract96 or by push-
91. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). Misstatements of fact and even intentional lies are not
forbidden. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
92. See GALENSON, supra note 5, at 88 (reporting on a 1983 survey conducted by
the AFL-CIO finding "that outside consultants or lawyers directed counter-organizing
drives" on behalf of employers in approximately 75 percent of union campaigns).
93. For a discussion of both the legal and illegal tactics used by U.S. employers
in opposing union organizing efforts, see Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing
Workers'Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1776-
81 (1983) and FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 230-33.
94. The usual remedy under the NLRA for the illegal discharge of an employee
organizer is a cease and desist order coupled with reinstatement and back pay. 29
U.S.C. § 160(c). The NLRA does not provide for fines, punitive damages or any
other "penalty," and the discharged employee is subject to a duty to mitigate losses by
finding alternative work. See CRAVER, supra note 74, at 151. This "make whole"
approach provides little in the way of deterrence for employers who realize that they
can chill union organization efforts by immediately firing the employee organizers.
See id.; Weiler, supra note 93, at 1788-90.
95. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 233-39 (summarizing empirical
studies concerning the impact of anti-union campaigns); but cf JuLIus G. GETMAN ET
AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY (1976) (finding that
most employees do not change their support for or against union representation be-
cause of an employer's anti-union tactics).
96. The only remedy recognized under the NLRA for a party's refusal to engage
in good faith bargaining is an order requiring that party to return to the bargaining
table. See H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185
N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), rev'd, UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971), en-
forced, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Thus, an employer may engage in protracted
"surface" bargaining with little fear of meaningful administrative intervention. See
WEILER, supra note 51, at 250 (noting "the incidence of bad faith bargaining has
risen" as employers "appreciate the lack of force in their obligation to recognize and
deal with a certified union"). This problem is particularly acute when used as a tactic
to avoid the consummation of an initial collective bargaining agreement. See FACT
FINDING REPORT, supra note 3, at 73-74 (reporting that approximately one-third of all
newly certified union representatives fail to conclude a first contract).
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ing unions into a strike and hiring permanent replacement workers.9 7 Both
strategies often result in a decertification election or an employer's lawful
withdrawal of recognition.9"
C. The Rise of Governmental Regulation
During this same period of union decline, the United States experienced
a significant increase in the amount of governmental regulation affecting the
employment relationship. Until the mid-1960s, the NLRA and the FLSA
were the only two federal statutes that comprehensively regulated the work-
place. That situation has changed dramatically. Congress since has enacted a
host of statutes that can be grouped into two basic categories. Some of these
statutes, such as Title V11 99 and the Americans with Disabilities Act,1° ° pro-
hibit workplace discrimination on the basis of certain protected characteris-
tics. A second category of statutes, such as the Occupational Safety and
Health Act' 0 and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 0 2 substantively estab-
lish minimum workplace requirements. In addition, state legislatures and
courts have adopted several limitations to the at-will presumption such as
97. The Supreme Court has ruled that an employer does not act unlawfully in
hiring permanent replacement workers to fill positions vacated by those engaged in a
lawful strike. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). In
addition, an employer lawfully may decline to reinstate a striker at the conclusion of a
strike so long as the position continues to be occupied by a permanent replacement.
Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968). The threat of permanent replacement
deters strikes and decreases the union's ability to use the threat of a strike as leverage
in collective bargaining. See Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act
Must be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 397, 421
(1992); Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn it Off, Tune it Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REv.
295, 296-97 (1991).
98. See GOULD IV, supra note 86, at 169 ("If the union cannot negotiate an
agreement, the result is virtually the same as decertification or lack of certification
during the organizational campaign."); Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the
Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 547, 565, 567 n.138 (noting
that permanent replacements frequently vote to decertify the union in an election held
a little more than twelve months after being hired).
99. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (2000).
100. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
101. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).
102. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (2000).
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statutes protecting employee whistle-blowing103 and court decisions authoriz-
ing tort claims for dismissals that offend public policy.
104
The simultaneous decline in unionization and rise of governmental
regulation likely are related developments. With the shrinking union sector
less capable of providing a meaningful counterweight to undeterred employer
discretion, many view governmental regulation as the next best line of de-
fense.
10 5
This governmental regulation, however, does little to compensate for the
mounting silence resulting from the decline of American unions. These stat-
utes may impose new workplace rules, but they provide no mechanism for the
ongoing communication of employee desires and complaints. Rather than
encouraging on-the-ground monitoring of workplace issues, these statutes
channel enforcement into the costly realm ofjudicial litigation. 0 6
III. ALTERNATE VOICE MECHANISMS
A. Individual Voice
Unions are not the only possible vehicles for employee voice. Another
alternative, for example, is for employees to express their viewpoints on an
individual basis.
I believe, however, that individual voice is inferior to collective voice in
addressing matters of workplace concern for several reasons. First, because
of the power imbalance between employers and employees in many work-
places, individual employees may be reluctant to express their candid view-
103. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 15.361-.369 (West 2000) (protecting
both private and public sector employees from retaliation for blowing the whistle on
alleged illegal acts). See also MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT
LAW 923 (4th ed. 1998) (reporting that 37 states have enacted some form of statutory
protection for employees reporting illegal activity).
104. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (finding
public policy cause of action for employee discharged for refusing to participate in an
unlawful price-fixing scheme). See also Michael A. Chagares, Utilization of the Dis-
claimer as an Effective Means to Define the Employment Relationship, 17 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 365, 400-05 (1989) (citing 43 states as recognizing the public policy cause of
action).
105. See GOULD IV, supra note 86, at 55-58 (discussing the interrelationship be-
tween the decline of unionization and the rise of governmental regulation); Clyde W.
Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L.
REV. 7, 15 (1988) (stating that with the decline in labor unions, "[s]ociety is now
looking to the courts and legislatures to protect employees not covered by collective
bargaining").
106. Estreicher, supra note 41, at 22 (noting that legislation "may poorly reflect
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points out of a concern for how their employer might react.1 °7 A 1988 Gallup
poll revealed that 45 percent of questioned workers reported, "there are con-
cers I'd like to raise with my employer but I've held back;" and that 54 per-
cent stated that "I'd feel more comfortable raising workplace problems
through an employee association, rather than as an individual."' lo Second,
many of the potential topics of an employee-employer dialogue involve "pub-
lic goods" such as workplace safety, production quotas, and layoff criteria.
While these issues affect the well-being of all workers, the absence of a col-
lective voice may make the incentive for an individual to attempt to effect
change single-handedly too small to spur action.' 9 Third, many workplaces
remain structured in a hierarchical Taylorist model.' 10 In these settings, man-
agement may simply dismiss individual communications as unimportant.
Finally, individual expression may not be representative of broader group
preferences and generally does not promote deliberations among employees
that may cultivate shared preferences." 1 Accordingly, an employee who does
choose to respond to individual concerns may be acting on inaccurate or
incomplete information.
112
B. Collective Voice-Looking to the East for a Model
Beginning in the 1980s, American firms increasingly became interested
in collective employee participation devices. 113 This interest was spurred on
by the relative success of the more participatory Japanese economy. 14 Japa-
nese firms have long used various employee participation programs (EPPs) as
a means of flattening organizational structures and motivating employee per-
107. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 9 (stating that "workers who are
tied to a firm are unlikely to reveal their true preferences to an employer, for fear the
employer may fire them"); Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 27 (stating that
"[t]he inequities in power that define an employment relation make individual voice
an uncertain channel of communication, inducing many employees to keep silent").
108. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 27 (reporting the results of the
Gallup poll).
109. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 25, at 8-9; John T. Addison et al., Ger-
man Works Councils and Firm Performance, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra
note 28, at 305, 313.
110. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (describing the Taylor model
of firm organization).
111. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 27.
112. Id.
113. See CAPPELLI ETAL.,supra note 84, at 41; LAWLER, supra note 28, at 10-14.
114. See CAPPELLI ET AL., supra note 84, at 41; JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE
MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 3-4, 98-100 (1990); Freeman & Rogers, supra
note 28, at 34.
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formance. 115 By the 1980s, Japan's growth in productivity far outpaced that
of the United States." 6 American firms began to see employee participation
as a possible solution to their own stagnating productivity." 
7
EPPs take many forms. Variations include joint labor-management
committees,' 18 quality circles,1 9 quality of work-life programs,' 20 self-
directed work teams,121 and, on a more holistic basis, total quality manage-
ment. 122 Despite the diversity of EPPs, these programs share some key char-
acteristics. Primarily, these programs represent employer-instigated efforts to
improve productivity, performance, and employee job satisfaction through a
115. See LAWLER, supra note 28, at 45-50 (describing the use of quality circles in
Japan); LEVINE, supra note 28, at 115-21 (describing employee involvement in Ja-
pan).
116. See LAWLER, supra note 28, at 14 (reporting that "Japanese productivity...
more than doubled, while that of the United States... increased by less than 50 per-
cent" from 1970 to the early 1980s).
117. Id. at 19-20; Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 34.
118. See Martin T. Moe, Note, Participatory Workplace Decisionmaking and the
NLRA: Section 8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1127, 1157-58 (1993). Joint labor-management committees usually
include employees and management officials and are generally "designed to address
multiple issues at the department or plant level and often serve as an umbrella under
which smaller employee involvement efforts operate. They may also serve as one
component of a larger program." Id. at 1157 (footnotes omitted).
119. Quality circles, also known as quality control circles, usually involve pro-
grams in which employers give employees the responsibility of identifying product-
quality and production-related problems. See id. at 1158; LAWLER, supra note 28, at
44-64; John R. McLain, Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1736, 1740 (1985).
Employees are then charged with finding solutions to those problems. See Moe, su-
pra note 118, at 1158.
120. Quality of work-life programs "focus primarily on making workers' jobs
more meaningful and satisfying, which presumptively leads to gains in worker pro-
ductivity." Moe, supra note 118, at 1159. These "programs involve various tech-
niques intended to bring about fundamental changes in an employer's organizational
structure and in the relations between workers and managers." Id.
121. Self-directed work teams are comprised of employees who are accountable
for some discrete segment of production. The company divides the employees into
groups or teams and each team has its own area of responsibility. See LAWLER, supra
note 28, at 101-18; Moe, supra note 118, at 1159.
122. See CAPPELLI ET AL., supra note 84, at 120 (defining total quality manage-
ment as a "[q]uality control approach that emphasizes the importance of communica-
tions, feedback, and team-work"); LEVINE, supra note 28, at 5-6 (describing total
quality management as involving "a set of tools that are intended to achieve continu-
ous improvement in quality and efficiency").
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cooperative dialogue involving both management and employee representa-
tives.
123
American companies have begun to use EPPs in increasing numbers
over the past two decades.'2 4 The use of EPPs is most pronounced in very
large firms where various surveys undertaken in the early 1990s reported that
approximately 80 percent of such firms utilize at least some type of employee
involvement practice for some groups of workers.' 25  The growth in EPPs
among large firms continued through the latter half of the decade in spite of a
climate of downsizing and economic insecurity. 26 These numbers, however,
tell only part of the story. Only about 25 to 30 percent of the workers em-
ployed by large firms actually are involved in these programs, 127 and partici-
pation at smaller firms is decidedly less extensive. 128 A number of studies
also have found that many EPPs are short-lived with a substantial number not
surviving more than five years. 129 Finally, when the focus narrows to the
most desirable type of EPPs, which involve both high levels of worker par-
ticipation and high levels of integration with other organizational practices,
only about 5 to 10 percent of American workplaces pass muster.'
30
Given the asserted benefits of employee participation discussed
above,13' one would expect that EPPs or some other collective participation
mechanism would be even more prevalent than they are today. One would
123. See, e.g., Michael S. Albright, The Legality of Employee Participation Pro-
grams Following the NLRB's Electromation, Inc. Decision, 1993 DETROIT C.L. REV.
1035, 1036; Bruce E. Kaufman, Does the NLRA Constrain Employee Involvement and
Participation Programs in Nonunion Companies?: A Reassessment, 17 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 729, 729 (1999); Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New
Millennium: Redefining a Labor Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1651-53, 1663-64 (1999); Moe, supra note 118, at 1127.
124. See generally LEVINE, supra note 28, at 6-8; FACT FINDING REPORT, supra
note 3, at 29.
125. See LEVINE, supra note 28, at 6-7; FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 3, at
34-36; Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 35.
126. See PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
NEw LABOR MARKET 81 (2001).
127. See LEVINE, supra note 28, at 7 (reporting that 31 percent of employees in
responding Fortune 1000 firms participated in an EPP in 1990); FACT FINDING
REPORT, supra note 3, at 35 (reporting that approximately 25 percent of employees
working for 51 surveyed large firms participated in an EPP in 1993).
128. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 60 (reporting that 10 to 15 percent
of all American firms had EPPs by the late 1980s)
129. See FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 3, at 36-37; Robert Drago, Quality
Circle Survival: An Exploratory Analysis, 27 INDUS. REL. 336 (1988).
130. See FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 3, at 36 (estimating that less than five
percent of all American workplaces use such "high performance" employment sys-
tems); Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 36 (reporting that only ten percent of
American firms employed such "advanced worker participation" programs).
131. See supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
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assume that employers would adopt EPPs in order to boost firm productivity,
and that employees would support the adoption of EPPs in order to facilitate
greater participatory democracy and individual dignity at work.
The Worker Representation and Participation Survey (WRPS) under-
taken by Freeman and Rogers provides strong empirical evidence in support
of the latter of these assumptions.
132
Professors Freeman and Rogers have painstakingly demonstrated that
employees want more influence at work through an independent voice
mechanism. After interviewing and re-interviewing more than 2400 workers,
the authors reported the following findings with regard to employee prefer-
ences:
0] Sixty-three percent of employees want more influence at
work.' 33 Fifty-three percent of those surveyed indicated that
they currently have less say in workplace decisions than they
desire.
134
0 Thirty-two percent of nonunion workers and 90 percent of cur-
rently unionized workers would vote for a union in a NLRB
election at their workplace. 35 In all, "44 percent of private
sector American workers would like to be represented by a un-
ion." 1
36
0] In choosing the attributes of an ideal workplace organization,
the vast majority of employees prefer one that acts coopera-
tively with management. 137 Eighty-five percent of employees
prefer an organization run jointly by employees and manage-
ment.
138
] In terms of the desired relationship between such an organiza-
tion and management, 44 percent of employees favor an or-
ganization that is "strongly independent"'139 of management, 43
percent of employees favor an organization that is "somewhat
132. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 6, at 40.
133. Id. at41 exhibit 3.1.
134. Id. at 51.
135. Id. at 68-69 exhibit 4.1.
136. Id. at 89 (noting that this figure is more than three times the 14 percent share
of the survey sample who reported union membership).
137. Id. at 56.
138. Id. at 56, 141-42 exhibit 7.1.
139. Id. at 146-47 exhibit 7.2. The authors define a "strongly independent" or-
ganization as one that both elects worker members and uses an outside arbitrator to
resolve disputes. Id. at 147 exhibit 7.2.
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independent" of management, 14 and the remaining employees
desire either no organization or one that is not independent of
management.141
0 When asked to select a single most preferable type of work-
place organization, 23 percent chose a union representative,
142
while 58 percent chose a joint employee-management commit-
tee that discusses and resolves workplace issues.
1 43
Freeman and Rogers contend that this survey documents a "representa-
tion/participation gap" in which worker desire for voice far exceeds its cur-
rent availability. 44 They find this gap to be "harmful to the nation's eco-
nomic progress and social well-being."' 145  Noting that the most-preferred
type of workplace organization is "an institutional form that does not effec-
tively exist in the United States,"' 46 Freeman and Rogers suggest that the
United States needs "a system that admits new institutions as well as exten-
sion of current ones.'
47
Managerial attitudes toward employee participation appear to be more
mixed. On the one hand, the increasing prevalence of EPPs illustrates that
many employers are receptive to at least some forms of employee participa-
140. Id. at 146-48, 147 exhibit 7.2. The authors define a "somewhat independent"
organization as one that either elects members without arbitration, functions with
volunteer representatives, or in which a management-appointed organization has
authority to submit disputes to an outside arbitrator. Id.
141. Id. at 146, 147 exhibit 7.2. The authors report that 7 percent of employees
want management to both select members of the organization and to possess unilat-
eral authority to resolve any areas of disagreement, while a different 7 percent indi-
cated that they did not want any workplace organization. Id.
142. Id at 150. The authors note that this support rises to 31 percent when em-
ployees have the option to choose an organization that functions like a union, but that
is not denominated as such. See id. at 150-51.
143. Id. at 152. The authors report that 36 percent of those who favored a joint
committee prefer that it act as a strongly independent institution, while 56 percent
prefer that it function in a somewhat independent manner. Id. A more recent 1999
survey commissioned by the AFL-CIO reached similar conclusions. Forty-three
percent of employees responding to that survey reported that they probably would
vote in favor of forming a union, while 79 percent stated that they probably would
vote to form an employee association. See OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 126, at 103
(reporting the results of a survey undertaken by Peter D. Hart Research Associates,
Inc, March 29-31, 1999).
144. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 6, at 50-51, 48-49 exhibit 3.5.
145. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 14.
146. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 6, at 152.
147. Id. at 155.
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tion. On the other hand, Taylorist attitudes 148 persist. The fact that participa-
tion programs extend only to a small sector of the workforce suggests that
many managers may view participation programs as a threat to managerial
discretion and flexibility. 49 Some commentators also see a lack of commit-
ment in the fact that many existing programs fall short of integrated practices
that effectuate meaningful participation.150 Some commentators, for exam-
ple, perceive many current programs as "largely talk [involving] trivial routi-
nization of management access to employee opinion rather than substantive
changes."' 5'1 This purported use of EPPs as symbolic gestures rather than
opportunities for participation may explain why American participation pro-
grams tend to be less successful and more short-lived than those in Japan.1
5 2
Managerial reluctance, however, is not the only obstacle to the devel-
opment of new devices for employee voice in the United States. An addi-
tional and substantial obstacle exists by way of current American labor law.
As detailed in the following section, the NLRA renders many, if not most,
employee participation programs illegal.
IV. NLRA SECTION 8(A)(2)
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other sup-
port to it."153 This provision was incorporated into the original Wagner Act
primarily as a means of outlawing the company-dominated unions that prolif-
erated during the 1920s and 1930s. 154 As the Senate Committee considering
the bill reported, "It seems clear that an organization or a representative or
agent paid by the employer for representing employees cannot command,
148. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Taylor model
of firm organization).
149. See LEVINE, supra note 28, at 83-85; Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at
36-37. See also DENNING, supra note 40, at 146-47 (attributing managerial reluctance
to accept full participation to "the power and tradition of the dominant market sys-
tem").
150. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 35-36; see also FACT FINDING
REPORT, supra note 3, at 36 (estimating that less than 5 percent of American firms use
integrated, "high performance" participation programs).
151. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 35.
152. See LAWLER, supra note 28, at 59-60, 63-64; SILVER, supra note 77, at 67-
68. Compare FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 6, at 105 (summarizing empirical
studies that EPPs in the United States raised productivity in the range of 2 to 5 per-
cent) with Kato & Morishima, supra note 39, at 516-17 (reporting an empirical study
showing that the use of complementary participation practices over time in Japan
raise productivity in the 8 to 9 percent range).
153. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2000).
154. See S. REP. No. 74-573, at 9-11 (1935).
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even if deserving it, the full confidence of such employees. And friendly
labor relations depend upon absolute confidence on the part of each side in
those who represent it. '
At first blush, Section 8(a)(2) would appear to be irrelevant since most
modem participatory mechanisms such as quality circles and work teams do
not operate like the sham company-dominated unions of yesteryear. The
NLRA's broad definition of what constitutes a "labor organization," however,
means that Section 8(a)(2) has the practical effect of banning most types of
EPPs. Section 2(5) of the NLRA defines a labor organization as "any organi-
zation of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or
plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."',
56
Based on these provisions, a two-part analysis is used in determining
whether a participatory program runs afoul of Section 8(a)(2). In the first
step, the NLRB must determine whether the program in question is a "labor
organization" under Section 2(5). 157 If so, the Board must then ascertain
whether the employer is dominating or interfering with the program.1
58
As an initial matter, three requirements must be met for an EPP to be
deemed a "labor organization." First, employees must participate in the
EPP.159 "[S]econd, the [EPP] must exist in whole or in part for the purpose of
'dealing with' the employer. ' 16° It is important to understand that "dealing
with" is not synonymous with collective bargaining. The Supreme Court has
adopted a broad understanding of "dealing with" to include an interactive
exchange in which employees make recommendations to representatives of
management. 6 1 Finally, the topics dealt with by the EPP must concern terms
and conditions of employment such as "grievances, labor disputes, wage
rates, employment hours, or working conditions."'1
62
155. Id. at 10.
156. National Labor Relations Act § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2000).
157. See, e.g., Albright, supra note 123, at 1047.
158. Id.
159. Note, Labor-Management Cooperation After Electromation: Implications
for Workplace Diversity, 107 HARv. L. REv. 678, 684 (1994).
160. Id.
161. See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 210-14 (1959). See also E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993) (stating that dealing in-
volves a "bilateral mechanism" evidenced by "a pattern or practice in which a group
of employees, over time, makes proposals to management, management responds to
these proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or deed, and compromise is not
required").
162. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2000); see Note, supra note 159, at 684.
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Most EPPs meet each of these requirements.' 63 The majority of EPP ar-
rangements involve teams or committees in which employees discuss and
make recommendations to management concerning terms and conditions of
employment. 164 Such a program meets the statutory definition of a "labor
organization" even if it lacks a formal structure, has no elected officers, and
does not require the payment of initiation fees or dues. 1
65
Most EPPs similarly meet the second prong of the Section 8(a)(2) test.
For instance, an employer who acts to establish, administrate, or support an
EPP likely will be found to "dominate or interfere" with the organization.
166
In addition, an employer may not contribute financially to an EPP without
triggering this prong.' 67  Significantly, the second prong of the Section
8(a)(2) test does not require a finding that the employer established the pro-
gram with either anti-union animus or an intent to interfere with employee
organizational rights. 1
68
The NLRB's landmark decision in Electromation, Inc. 169 illustrates the
reach of the Section 8(a)(2) prohibition. In that case, an employer established
five "action committees" in which certain employees and management repre-
sentatives met to discuss such issues as absenteeism, workplace smoking, and
pay progression for premium positions. 170 The NLRB found that the commit-
tees constituted "labor organizations" because the participating employees
bilaterally discussed terms and conditions of employment with management
representatives. 171 The NLRB further ruled that the employer "dominated"
these organizations by creating the committees and by determining their
structure and functions. 172 The NLRB, accordingly, concluded that the em-
ployer violated Section 8(a)(2) in spite of the lack of any evidence that the
employer established the committees for the purpose of deterring union or-
ganization efforts.
173
163. See Note, supra note 159, at 684-85; David W. Orlandini, Comment, Em-
ployee Participation Programs: How to Make Them Work Today and in the Twenty-
First Century, 24 CAP. U. L. REv. 597, 607-08 (1995).
164. See Kaufman, supra note 123, at 809.
165. Fire Alert Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 910, 912 n.12 (1970).
166. See, e.g., Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d
1148 (7th Cir. 1994); Orlandini, supra note 163, at 608.
167. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2000); see also Orlandini, supra note 163, at 608.
168. See NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241
(1939).
169. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
170. See id. at 991.
171. See id. at 997.
172. See id. at 997-98.
173. See id. at 991-92, 997-98. Member Raudabaugh, in a concurring opinion,
suggested a less limiting test that would permit employers to establish EPPs under
circumstances in which the employer's motive is not to stifle unionization but "solely
to enhance lawful entrpreneurial goals." See id. at 1014 (Radabaugh concurring).
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Of course, not every EPP runs afoul of Section 8(a)(2). Employee
committees that operate as a suggestion box or that simply share information
with management, for example, are not "labor organizations" in that they are
not engaged in "dealing with" an employer. 74 In a 2001 decision, the Board
underscored that an employee committee that exercises delegated authority
with respect to management issues, as opposed to terms and conditions of
employment, also does not violate Section 8(a)(2).175 In addition, it is clear
that many existing EPPs survive despite their illegality.' 76 Nonetheless, Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) serves as a significant deterrent to the growth and development of
employee participation in the United States.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Since NLRA § 8(a)(2) stands as an obstacle to the formation of many
types of EPPs, it is not surprising that numerous reform proposals have called
for an amendment of that provision. These proposals come in many varia-
tions, but all share the common objective of enabling greater employee voice
in the workplace.
A. Full Repeal of Section 8(a)(2)
Some commentators suggest a total repeal of Section 8(a)(2). 77 This
would have the effect of permitting employers to experiment with an unlim-
174. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).
175. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 699 (2001). Some commentators
read this decision as providing "a potential turning point" toward a less restrictive
interpretation of Section 8(a)(2). See, e.g., Gerald L. Pauling II & M. Andrew
McGuire, The Implications of Crown Cork & Seal Co. for Employee Involvement
Committees as Labor Organizations under the NLRA: What Constitutes "Dealing
with" Pursuant to Section 2(5) of the Act Since Electromation, Inc.? 18 Lab. Law.
215, 233 (2002). On the other hand, the NLRB's ruling that an employee committee
with delegated managerial authority does not "deal" with management is not new, see
General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977), and, in fact, was even acknowl-
edged by the NLRB in its Electromation decision. See Electromation, Inc., 309
N.L.R.B. at 995.
176. At least part of the reason for their survival is that these devices are viewed
by many employees as desirable mechanisms for providing some type of voice in the
workplace. See FREEMAN AND ROGERS, supra note 6, at 151 exhibit 7.4 (showing that
most employees want workplace participation through a joint employee-management
committee). Few complaints are actually brought to the NLRB alleging Section
8(a)(2) violations. FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 3, at 54. "A recent study found
an average of about three such NLRB decisions a year over the last quarter century."
Id.
177. See, e.g., Bruce E. Kaufman, The Employee Participation/Representation
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ited range of possible involvement programs. 178 But such a complete de-
regulation would go too far. Employers would be free to establish company-
dominated organizations whose purpose was to suppress union organizing
efforts rather than to afford any true measure of independent representation.
This approach, accordingly, carries the potential for substituting employer-
dominated voice for union-sponsored voice.
B. Reform Labor Law
From the opposite end of the political spectrum, many commentators
have called for labor law reform as a means to increase employee voice
through a reinvigorated labor movement. Although proposals for revamping
the NLRA come in many stripes,' 79 most proposals focus on ensuring free
choice in the union election process, facilitating first contracts, restricting the
use of permanent replacement workers, and enhancing remedies for unfair
labor practices. 1 80
These proposals would do much to correct the current tilt in the labor
law playing field. These suggestions, if adopted, would put employers and
unions on a more equal footing and help to accomplish the NLRA's stated
objective of protecting employee rights of self-organization and collective
bargaining.' 81
Even with these reforms, however, it is doubtful that union density in
the United States ever will extend beyond 20 or 25 percent of the workforce
in the foreseeable future. 182 As discussed above, deficiencies in the NLRA
178. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union"
Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 125, 160 (1994) (arguing in favor of experimentation in the design of nonun-
ion EPPs).
179. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 97 (proposing, among other ideas, increased
union access to employees during organizational campaigns and permitting limited
forms of secondary pressure); Estreicher, supra note 41, at 43-44 (proposing, among
other ideas, relaxing existing prohibitions on pre-hire agreements and repealing the
NLRA's authorization of state "right to work" laws); Summers, supra note 45, at 801-
09 (proposing, among other ideas, limitations on employer speech and broadening the
scope of mandatory bargaining).
180. See generally CRAVER, supra note 74, at 126-55; GOULD IV, supra note 86,
at 151-203; REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 4,
at 15-24; Befort, supra note 47, at 432-43. -
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
182. See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 79, at 252 (predicting that labor law reform
only would have the effect of slowing the continued decline in union membership);
WEILER, supra note 51, at 79-81 (predicting that substantial labor law reform would
make a significant difference in the prospects for union representation, but that the
rise in union membership would fall far short of the then 45 percent union density
figure for Canada); Bellace, supra note 77, at 23 (predicting that labor law reform
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are only one of several factors that have contributed to labor's decline. Other
factors, such as the global economy, the loss of manufacturing jobs, and
America's traditional antipathy for collective action, will continue to militate
against any greater rebound in union strength.18
3
This means that some mechanism other than traditional union represen-
tation must be found in order to provide a collective voice for the vast major-
ity of the workforce. The NLRA's current prohibition on many types of EPPs
is not acceptable in an environment in which the vast majority of Americans
are not represented by unions.
C. Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2)
Most attention for reform has focused on a partial repeal of Section
8(a)(2). These proposals generally have attempted to expand the range of
lawful participation devices while guarding against the use of such devices
for anti-union purposes.
This is the route suggested by the Dunlop Commission. The Commis-
sion's final report recommended that Congress clarify Section 8(a)(2) so that
nonunion EPPs are not deemed "unlawful simply because they involve dis-
cussion of terms and conditions of work or compensation where such discus-
sion is incidental to the broad purposes of these programs."' 84 The Commis-
sion, however, would continue the prohibition on company-dominated un-
ions, particularly where an employer establishes a program "with the purpose
of frustrating employee efforts to obtain independent representation.
A somewhat more pro-employer variant is the TEAM Act that Congress
passed in 1996,186 but which President Clinton vetoed. 187 This legislation
would have amended Section 8(a)(2) so as to make clear that an employer's
creation of an EPP is not an unfair labor practice, even if it addresses terms
and conditions of employment, so long as the entity does not seek "to negoti-
ate or enter into collective bargaining agreements." 188 This version appears to
permit the formation of company unions so long as their proceedings are not
reduced to a written agreement.ms9
would result in only a modest increase in union density to encompass about 15 per-
cent of the private sector workforce).
183. See supra notes 73-98 and accompanying text.
184. REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 4, at
8.
185. Id.
186. Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, H.R. 743, 104th Con-
gress (1996).
187. 142 CONG. REC. H8816 (daily ed. July 30, 1996).
188. H.R. 743.
189. See Arthur J. Martin, Company Sponsored Employee Involvement: A Union
Perspective, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 119, 136-37 (1996) (characterizing the TEAM Act
and the Dunlop Commission recommendation as "nothing more or less than attempts
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Others have proposed a more pro-employee version of partial repeal in
which employer-sponsored EPPs would be tolerated only upon compliance
with various structural safeguards. As an example, Professors Summers and
Hyde both would permit EPPs only if approved by a secret-ballot election of
the employees in question. 9° Similarly, a group of six professors crafted an
Employee Involvement Bill as an alternative to the TEAM Act which would
partially repeal Section 8(a)(2) subject to a number of conditions designed to
ensure that EPPs would operate in a democratic fashion.'
91
The shared shortcoming of all of these proposals is that they merely tol-
erate, rather than require, employee involvement. Thus, an easing of the Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) ban on employer-dominated EPPs would result in more employee
involvement only if individual employers desired that result.' 92 Further, the
design, operation, and duration of such programs is entirely within manage-
ment's discretion. At present, there is much to suggest that many employers
would prefer to muffle rather than to amplify employee voice.1 93 And, while
to legitimize the company unions that flourished in the darkest days of early industri-
alization in order to frustrate employees' efforts to organize"); see also Charles B.
Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation is Required in a Declining Union Environ-
ment to Provide Employees with Meaningful Industrial Democracy, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 135, 142-43 (1997) (criticizing the TEAM Act for not containing safeguards
to ensure that employers not use EPPs as a mechanism for thwarting unionization).
190. See generally Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the
Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 149 (1993); Clyde W.
Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception to Section
8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 129 (1993).
191. See Charles J. Morris, Will There Be a New Direction for American Indus-
trial Relations?-A Hard Look at the TEAM Bill, The Sawyer Substitute Bill, and the
Employee Involvement Bill, 47 LAB. L. J. 89, 98-102 (1996). The six professors are
Charles J. Morris, Thomas A. Kochan, Clyde W. Summers, William N. Cooke,
Charles B. Craver, and Harry C. Katz. Id. at 89-90. The Employee Involvement Bill
would add two provisos to Section 8(a)(2). The first proviso would permit EPPs
where no union representation exists and the EPP does not seek to represent employ-
ees with regard to grievances, wages, and other working conditions. Id. at 99-100.
The second set of conditions would apply where the EPP is representational in nature.
Id. at 100. Here, five conditions must be met that, on the whole, assure affected em-
ployees a democratic process with regard to how the EPP runs and how the members
are chosen. Id.
192. See WEILER, supra note 51, at 206-11 (discussing how EPPs generally exist
at the discretion of the employer and that even if workers want workplace involve-
ment, if the employer does not, then no EPP will exist because management alone has
the power to decide).
193. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. See also Michael C. Harper,
A Framework for the Rejuvenation of the American Labor Movement, 76 IND. L.J.
103, 115 (2001) (concluding that "[tihe different responses of management to average
workers in union and nonunion environments... do not reflect an inability to hear the
voices of these workers without the amplification of union representation, but rather a
lack of interest in listening"); H. Victoria Hedian, The Implications of Crown Cork &
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the sheer number of EPPs has risen in recent years, many of those programs
are designed to influence worker preferences rather than to listen to worker
194
concerns.
VI. THE WORKS COUNCILS ALTERNATIVE
Perhaps we have been looking in the wrong direction for ways to over-
come Section 8(a)(2) and to enhance employee voice. Rather than looking to
the Far East in seeking to replicate employer-initiated quality circles and
work teams, we would do better to perform an about face and look toward
Western Europe and its experience with works councils.
Rogers and Streeck "define works councils as institutionalized bodies
for representative communication between a single employer... and the em-
ployees ... of a single plant or enterprise."' 195 As they are most often consti-
tuted, "works councils are elected bodies of employees who meet regularly
with management to discuss establishment level" issues.1 96 Works councils
differ from the EPPs discussed above in that they are institutional bodies in-
dependent of management and serve to aggregate the views of workers into a
common voice. 197 Works councils, for the most part, 198 do not usurp manage-
rial discretion-they have no right to strike or to engage in negotiations over
wages-but nonetheless amplify employee voice through rights to informa-
tion and consultation over a broad range of labor and personnel matters. 199
As such, the relationship between management and works councils tends to
Seal Co. for Employee Involvement Committees as "Labor Organizations'" under the
Wagner Act: What Constitutes "Dealing with" Pursuant to Section 2(5) of the Act
Since Electromation, Inc.,? 18 Lab. Law. 235, 258 (2002) (stating that "[e]mployers
want to hear what employees have to say as long as it is what they want to hear. If
employees present a contradicting viewpoint, employers often react negatively.").
194. See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753,
825-78 (1994); Harper, supra note 193, at 113-14.
195. Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, The Study of Works Councils: Concepts
and Problems, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND
COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 3, 6 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds.,
1995).
196. FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 3, at 43; Rogers and Streeck, supra note
195, at 6.
197. Rogers & Streeck, supra note 195, at 8.
198. The German works council system serves as an exception in giving councils
co-determination rights with regard to some decisions. See infra notes 235-37 and
accompanying text.
199. See INVOLVEMENT OF EMPLOYEES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION XVI (Roger
Blanpain ed., 2002) [hereinafter Blanpain]; Richard B. Freeman & Edward P. Lazear,
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be relatively cooperative and non-adversarial. 2" In short, works councils are
a close approximation of the type of employee involvement mechanism that
workers favored so highly in the Worker Representation and Participation
Survey. 20 ' Works councils may either be voluntary in nature, as they are in
Japan, 202 or mandated as they are in most of Western Europe.203 Most West-
ern European countries, with the notable exception of England and Ireland,
have adopted legislation mandating some form of works councils system in
enterprises above some minimum size.204  Many of these statutes were
adopted in the 1970s 20 5 and, as chronicled by Wolfgang Streeck, the ensuing
years witnessed a "remarkable convergence of European industrial relations
systems on a pattern of representative consultation--or participation-at the
workplace, promoted by public policy, infused with union influence, and
more or less willingly accepted by employers.
' 20 6
A. Works Councils in the European Union
The European Union has given works councils an extra-national boost
with the recent adoption of three significant directives colloquially known as
"the three sisters. ' 2° 7 The directives provide mechanisms by which employee
representatives may exercise influence on enterprise decisions, 208 and each
directive obligates the covered parties to work together in a "spirit of coop-
eration.
2 °9
200. See Joel Rogers, United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home, in WORKS
COUNCILS, supra note 195, at 375, 385 (describing how European employers direct
their efforts at building constructive relationships with works councils rather than
opposing their existence); Clyde W. Summers, An American Perspective of the Ger-
man Model of Worker Participation, 8 COMP. LAB. L. J. 333, 344 (1987) (stating that
works council members in Germany "view themselves not so much as adversaries of
management, but as co-managers").
201. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
202. Although the Japanese version of works councils, denominated as "joint
consultation committees," are not mandated by law, they are widespread among large
Japanese firms. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 55-56; Kato & Morishima,
supra note 39, at 493.
203. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 45-46.
204. See id.; Freeman & Lazear, supra note 199, at 29.
205. See Wolfgang Streeck, Works Councils in Western Europe: From Consulta-
tion to Participation, in WORKS COUNCILS, supra note 195, at 313, 321-27.
206. Id. at 347.
207. Blanpain, supra note 199, at XVI-XVII.
208. Id. at XV-XVI.
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1. European Works Councils Directive
In 1994, the European Union approved a directive requiring large multi-
national corporations that operate in two or more European Union states to
establish an enterprise-wide works council or similar mechanism for the pur-
pose of providing information and facilitating employee consultation.210 Al-
together, more than 1,800 of these transnational bodies will be established
under this directive.211
2. European Company Statute
In 2001, the European Union adopted a directive providing for consulta-
tive mechanisms for every European Company set up as a merger of two or
more enterprises located in different member states, or by transformation of
an existing enterprise. 212 This directive calls for the creation of a special rep-
resentative employee negotiating committee whose role is to determine an
information-sharing and consultation arrangement equal to or exceeding the
directive's minimum standards. 213 This arrangement may involve either the
appointment of employee representatives to the company board or the crea-
tion of a separate employee consultative body.214 The member states of the
European Union have a three-year period to transpose the directive's re-
quirements into national legislation.
215
3. General Framework Directive
Most recently, in 2002, the European Union adopted a new, far-reaching
directive that establishes a general framework for information and consulta-
210. Council Directive 94/45, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64. The directive applies to all
enterprises that employ more than 1,000 workers within the member states, including
at least 150 employees in each of two member states. Id. See generally Blanpain,
supra note 199, at 3-104.
211. See Stavroula Demetriades, European Works Councils Directive: A Success
Story?, in QUALITY OF WORK AND EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPE 49, 49
(Marco Biagi ed., 2002). Thus far, the implementation of this directive has been
rather slow, with 665 councils established as of the writing of this chapter. See id.
212. Council Directive 2001/86, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 22.
213. See Blanpain, supra note 199, at 107-215; Manfred Weiss, Workers' In-
volvement in the European Company, in QUALITY OF WORK AND EMPLOYEE
INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPE, supra note 211, at 63, 72-76.
214. See Blanpain, supra note 199, at 108-10. The directive takes this optional
approach so that the member states can choose a model that corresponds best with
their respective national traditions. Id. at 108.
215. See Marco Biagi, Quality of Work, Industrial Relations and Employee In-
volvement in Europe: Thinking the Unthinkable?, in QUALITY OF WORK AND
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPE, supra note 211, at 3, 17.
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216
tion rights throughout all of the member states. This directive is not aimed
at transnational undertakings, but instead mandates a general requirement of
information sharing and consultation for all European enterprises with more
than fifty employees and all plants with more than twenty employees.
217
Although most member states already have legislation mandating employee
consultation, this directive goes further to require countries to adopt mini-
mum Europe-wide standards for information and consultation 218 as well as
enhanced enforcement of those mandates. 219 The directive provides for a
normal three-year implementation period, but with additional extensions for
countries like England and Ireland that have no current system for informa-
tion and consultation.
220
Roger Blanpain summarized in a recent book the impetus for this wave
of employee involvement directives as follows:
Economic globalisation and the speedy advance of the market
economy world-wide has in many countries resulted in a retreat by
governments from the running of the economy and greater freedom
for management ....
At the same time and as a consequence, traditional, especially
national collective bargaining structures, are slowly eroding in
many countries, while overall, trade unions are losing members
and their grip on the labour markets....
216. Council Directive 2002/14, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29.
217. Id. at art. 3.; see also Blanpain, supra note 199, at 221-22; Alan C. Neal,
Information and Consultation for Employees-Still Seeking the Philosopher's Stone?,
in QUALITY OF WORK AND EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPE, supra note 211, at
83, 92-94.
218. See Neal, supra note 217, at 95-96. The directive provides that information
and consultation shall cover, at a minimum,
(a) information on the recent and probable development of the undertak-
ing's or the establishment's activities and economic situation;
(b) information and consultation on the situation, structure and probable
development of employment within the undertaking... ; [and]
(c) information and consultation on decisions likely to lead to substantial
changes in work organisation or in contractual ....
Council Directive 2002/14, art. 4, para. 2, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29; see also Blanpain,
supra note 199, at 222.
219. See Biagi, supra note 215, at 13. The Directive provides that an employment
decision may be cancelled in the event of a serious breach of information or consulta-
tion rights that result in direct and immediate consequences in terms of substantial
changes or termination of employment contracts or relationships. Council Directive
2002/14, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29.
220. See Council Directive 2002/14, art. 10-11, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29; Blanpain,
supra note 199, at 225-26.
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Increased and often world-wide competition leads to ongoing re-
structuring, mergers, outsourcing and downsizing, and to the at-
omisation of individual employment relationships....
So, and the question arises naturally, where are the employees in
all this?... what about the employees' voice?
22 1
These forces and concerns obviously exist on this side of the Atlantic as well.
Taken together, the "three sisters" effectively establish a continent-wide
norm of employee participation through works councils institutions. 222 In the
words of Alan Neal, these directives have the potential to serve "as a monu-
ment to regulatory optimism'' 23 that will "nourish effective information, con-
sultation and participation for workers throughout the European Commu-
nity.' ,224 They also may lay the ground work for a new international norm of
industrial relations.
225
B. Works Councils in Germany
Although works councils vary widely across countries in structure and
function,226 the German works council system, as the oldest and most well-
22728developed, is worth a closer look.228 Under the German Works Constitu-
221. Blanpain, supra note 199, at XV.
222. Works councils are growing in Eastern Europe as well. See, e.g., Michael
Federowicz & Anthony Levitas, Poland: Councils Under Communism and Neoliber-
alism, in WORKS COUNCILS, supra note 195, at 283. This development undoubtedly
will accelerate as the European Union expands to encompass more eastern European
members. See Michal Seweryfiski, Employee Involvement and EU Enlargement-
Polish Perspective, in QUALITY OF WORK AND EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPE,
supra note 211, at 263.
223. Neal, supra note 217, at 99.
224. Id. at 98.
225. See, e.g., Martin Foley, Democratising the Workplace--Unions and Work
Councils?, in WORKS COUNCILS IN AUSTRALIA: FUTURE PROSPECTS AND
POSSIBILITIES 37, 43-45 (Paul J. Gollan et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the desirability
of Australia adopting a works councils form of employee participation similar to that
used in western Europe).
226. In Sweden and Italy, for example, consultation occurs primarily through
union representatives rather than through stand-alone bodies. See Streeck, supra note
205, at 330.
227. The first Works Council Law was enacted in Weimer Germany in 1920. The
statute was revoked during the Nazi era and reintroduced following World War II.
The statute subsequently was amended in both 1952 and 1972. See Janice R. Bellace,
The Role of Law in Supporting Cooperative Employee Representation Systems, 15
COMe. LAB. L.J. 441, 456 (1994); Lutringer & Dichter, supra note 88, at 4-54 to 4-55.
228. A number of English-language publications describe German works coun-
cils. See, e.g., MANFRED WEISS, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN
2004]
33
Befort: Befort:New Voice for the Workplace:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
tion Act,229 an employer who employs a minimum of five employees must
establish a works council upon the request of three or more employees.230 The
size of the council varies with the size of the employer, and the employees
elect representatives in a manner that reflects the composition of the work-
force.
23 1
The works council is empowered to consult with management on a vari-
ety of plant or enterprise-related topics.232 The works council has the right to
receive information from, and exchange views with, management concerning
the employer's compliance with applicable laws and on general business mat-
ters.233 The employer also must consult with the works council prior to the
hiring, transfer, or termination of employees. 234 Finally, unlike in most coun-
tries where works councils have rights only to information and consulta-
tion,235 German works councils have a right of "co-determination" with re-
spect to a number of "social" topics, such as work scheduling, safety meas-
ures, and the restructuring of jobs.236 If the parties cannot come to agreement
on one of these topics, the dispute is referred to arbitration for final and bind-
ing resolution. 237 The works council is forbidden to engage in wage bargain-
GERMANY Chap. 5 (1995); Rudolf Buschmann, Workers Participation and Collective
Bargaining in Germany, 15 Comp. LAB. L.J. 26 (1993); Lutringer & Dichter, supra
note 88, at 4-54 to 4-68; Walther Mfiller-Jentsch, Germany: From Collective Voice to
Co-management, in WORKS COUNCILS, supra note 195, at 53; Summers, supra note
200, at 333.
229. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Works Constitution Act, BetrVG], BGBI. I, Tiel I
13 (Jan. 15, 1972).
230. See Lutringer & Dichter, supra note 88, at 4-55 to 4-57.
231. See id. at 4-57 to 4-58. The statute requires that salaried and hourly workers
be proportionately represented in the works council. See Muiller-Jentsch, supra note
228, at 73.
232. German works councils and management are required to meet on at least a
monthly basis. See MOller-Jentsch, supra note 228, at 65
233. See Lutringer & Dichter, supra note 88, at 4-60 to 4-61.
234. See id. at 4-61 to 4-62. An employer may discharge a worker even if the
works council disapproves of such action. Id. at 4-62. The employee, however, may
challenge the termination by appealing to the labor court, and the employer can rely
only on its explanation previously given to the works council in attempting to estab-
lish sufficient cause for the discharge. Id. at 4-20 to 4-25, 4-62.
235. See Blanpain, supra note 199, at XV; Freeman & Lazear, supra note 199, at
29.
236. See Buschmann, supra note 228, at 31; Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at
49; Lutringer & Dichter, supra note 88, at 4-62 to 4-63. The results of negotiations
between employers and works councils are set out in written "works agreements."
Miller-Jentsch, supra note 228, at 60. Most of the issues covered in these agreements
concern topics subject to co-determination rights. Id. at 60-61.
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ing, 23 to strike, or to use other types of economic action in support of its po-
sition.
2 39
The works councils in Germany serve to supplement, rather than to sup-
plant, traditional unions. In Germany, unions tend to bargain on economic
matters on a national or regional basis within certain industries. 24 Works
councils may seek to enforce or supplement the union agreement at the local
level, but the applicable union contract preempts any contradictory works
council arrangement. 241 Although the unions play no official role in the
works council operation, a majority of works council members also are union
members, thereby ensuring a considerable amount of coordination in ef-
forts.
242
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR AN AMERICAN WORKS COUNCILS ACT
The German works councils system offers an interesting possible model
for enhancing the voice of American workers. The adoption of such a system
necessarily would require enacting federal legislation. Some of the suggested
features of an American Works Councils Act are set out below, followed by a
discussion of the respective advantages and arguable disadvantages of such a
system.
A. The Structure and Functions ofAmerican Works Councils
The European Union General Framework Directive243 and the German
Works Constitution Ac2 provide a workable model for an American Works
Councils Act. Some of the salient features of the proposed act would include
the following:
238. See Lutringer & Dichter, supra note 88, at 4-54; Rogers & Streeck, supra
note 195, at 7.
239. See Bellace, supra note 227, at 447-48; Lutringer & Dichter, supra note 88,
at 4-54.
240. See generally Lutringer & Dichter, supra note 88, at 4-37 to 4-49; Clyde W.
Summers, The Usefulness of Unions in a Major Industrial Society--A Comparative
Sketch, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1412-14 (1984).
241. See Lutringer & Dichter, supra note 88, at 4-54.
242. See Otto Jacobi et al., Germany: Codetermining the Future?, in INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE 218, 243-44 (Anthony Ferner & Richard Hyman eds.,
1992) (estimating that 75 percent of German works council members belong to unions
affiliated with the central labor federation); Summers, supra note 240, at 1416 (esti-
mating that 80 percent of those employees elected to German works councils are
nominated from union slates). Works councils and unions in Germany frequently
work closely together. See WEISS, supra note 228, at 169, 174-75.
243. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 226-42 and accompanying text.
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1) Employees would have the automatic right to call for the creation of a
works council in an enterprise or facility above a certain minimum size.
2) Employees would be empowered to elect representatives periodically
with hourly and salaried employees represented on a proportional basis.
3) The works council would be entitled to receive information periodi-
cally from the employer with respect to personnel policies, financial condi-
tions, and plans for future undertakings that may impact the performance and
organization of work.
4) The works council would be entitled to consult periodically with the
employer on a broad range of subjects. These topics should go beyond terms
and conditions of employment subject to negotiation under the NLRA2 45 to
also include:
a) the manner of work performance and organization;
b) the hiring, transfer, and termination of employees;
c) compliance with pertinent laws and regulations; and
d) entrepreneurial decisions that may impact the performance and or-
ganization of work.
5) The works council should not have the right to bargain with respect to
employee compensation in the absence of an employer's consent.
24
To this point, my proposal looks similar to that suggested by Professor
Paul Weiler, perhaps the most vocal proponent of an American works coun-
cils system. Professor Weiler similarly has endorsed importing most aspects
247
of the German system with two major exceptions. First, Professor Weiler
recommends that disagreements involving matters subject to co-
determination be resolved by affording the affected employees the right to
strike rather than through binding arbitration. 248 Second, he suggests that in a
unionized workplace, the local union, upon majority vote, should serve as the
works council body.249
I disagree with Professor Weiler on both points. Providing works coun-
cils with the right to strike would alter radically the consultative nature of that
institution. Rather than being a body that is directed to seek solutions with
management in a "spirit of cooperation, ,250 the availability of concerted ac-
tion would transform works councils into a more adversarial body akin to that
of American unions. Of course, Professor Weiler is right in arguing that
mandatory binding interest arbitration is inconsistent with American labor
245. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
246. See infra notes 290-93 and accompanying text (discussing why wage bar-
gaining should not be mandatory topic of consultation).
247. WEILER, supra note 51, at 283-95.
248. See id. at 290.
249. See id. at 294. Professor Weiler suggests that a second council would be
necessary for nonunion employees at the work site, with the two councils coordinat-
ing their efforts in consulting with management. See id. at 294-95.
250. See Blanpain, supra note 199, at XVIII-XIX (citing to language contained in
each of the three European Union directives).
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traditions.251 The only real solution, it appears, is to require the consultative
process, but without imposing any formal impasse-breaking mechanism.
25 2
This, in fact, is the approach used in most European systems and in the three
European Union directives.
253
On Professor Weiler's second point, enabling the local union to serve as
the consultative body blurs the essential distinction between the nature of
these two entities. Unions are independent institutions with the right to com-
pel collective bargaining on terms and conditions of employment and the
right to back up bargaining positions with concerted economic action.254
Works councils, on the other hand, are parliamentary-type consultative bodies
that address a broader array of topics at the local level in a less confronta-
tional manner.25 5 If unions serve both functions, it is likely that the consulta-
tive function will become submerged in the union's bargaining agenda.256 A
better resolution is to keep the two entities separate, but, as in Germany, per-
mit unions to endorse candidates for works council membership. 7
B. The Advantages of an American Works Councils System
The adoption of an American works councils system as outlined above
would serve several positive policy interests. The following five advantages
of such a system are particularly noteworthy.
First, the adoption of an American works councils system would do
much to close the "representation/participation gap" documented by Freeman
and Rogers.258  As the Worker Representation and Participation Survey
251. See id. at 290 ("Under American labor policy, at least in the private sector,
we have decided for good reasons not to give unions a regime of binding interest
arbitration."); see also Summers, supra note 200, at 352 ("Recourse to arbitration to
settle an interest dispute, as under the Works Constitution Act, runs directly counter to
the deeply rooted American principle of free collective bargaining.").
252. This would not necessarily result in a lack of good faith consultation by
management. Employers would have an incentive to consult in good faith so as not to
create a disgruntled group of employees who then might find the option of union
representation more palatable.
253. See Blanpain, supra note 199, at XV (discussing the European Union direc-
tives); Freeman & Lazear, supra note 199, at 29 (discussing national systems).
254. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
255. See generally FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 3, at 43. Works councils,
unlike German unions, function at the local level and maintain independence from the
union. See generally Summers, supra note 200, at 343-45.
256. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 62-63 (maintaining that works
councils should not engage in wage bargaining because they are an institution de-
signed to increase enterprise surplus rather than to fight over how firm profits should
be divided).
257. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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found, 63 percent of American workers want more influence at work,2 5 9 and
the proportion of workers who want representation through an organization
with at least some independence of management is more than six times
greater than the current rate of unionization. 260 Since covered employees of
the proposed American Works Councils Act would have the automatic right
to a participatory works council, the adoption of such a measure would mean
that a clear majority of American employees would shortly obtain the greater
voice that they desire.
Second, works councils resemble the type of institution that the WRPS
identified as what American workers want. Freeman and Rogers reported
that a significant majority of American employees desire representation
through an independent organization 261 that works cooperatively with man-
agement in addressing workplace issues.262 As opposed to many of the em-
ployer-initiated EPPs discussed above, works councils operate in exactly this
manner.
Third, this proposal would foster less adversarial and more productive
employee-employer relations. The existence and composition of works coun-
cils would be determined by employees in a democratic fashion rather than in
a pitched battle like so many union representation elections under the
NLRA263 The absence of wage bargaining and strikes should mean that
works councils are unlikely to engender the same degree of opposition that
American employers have displayed toward unions. As in Europe, it is likely
that employers eventually will move away from opposing works councils and
toward building more constructive relationships. This, in turn, should en-
hance the productivity and democratic participation benefits of voice as dis-
cussed above.2
65
259. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 6, at 41 exhibit 3.1.
260. Compare id. at 146-48 (reporting that 87 percent of WRPS respondents indi-
cated a desire for representation by an organization that is either "strongly" or
"somewhat" independent of management) with Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, U.S. Department of Labor, Union Members in 2003 (Jan. 21, 2004), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (reporting that 12.9 percent of the
current nonagricultural workforce are union members).
261. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 6, at 146-48.
262. See id. at 56. Fifty-eight percent of responding employees chose a joint em-
ployee-management committee as their single most preferable type of workplace
organization. Id. at 151-52.
263. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text (discussing management op-
position to unions in the context of union organizing campaigns).
264. See Rogers, supra note 200, at 385 (describing how European employers
direct their efforts at building constructive relationships with works councils rather
than opposing their existence).
265. See supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, many increasingly view works councils as a transplantable
model of employee-employer relations. 266 As recently as the early 1970s,
267
only a few European countries had functioning works councils systems.
Works councils now have spread to the vast majority of Western European
countries, and the European Union's recent directives mean that Great Britain
268
and Ireland will soon join the fold. Other countries, as well, are paying
serious attention to this system as a counter-weight to the world-wide phe-
nomenon of declining unionization rates.269
Which leads to the fifth and perhaps the most important advantage:
works councils may be and should be on the way to becoming a new interna-
tional labor norm. If anything is needed to correct the current disarray of
labor and employment law, it is the development of a new consensus on in-
ternational labor norms.
The forces of global trade and technology dramatically have altered the
relative influence of labor and capital in the economic marketplace. The new
global economy places a premium on capital flexibility270 which, in turn, has
set off a race to the bottom in employment regulation.271 The good news and
the bad news is that the United States continues to win this race. While the
American economic engine continues to dominate the world economy,
266. This belief certainly underlies the adoption of the three European Union
directives calling for the creation of works councils institutions throughout an expand-
ing European Union, see generally Blanpain, supra note 199, at XV-XX; Neal, supra
note 217, at 98-99, and in the increasing analysis being given in other countries to the
possible adoption of a works councils form of employee involvement, see, e.g., Foley,
supra note 225, at 43-45 (Australia).
267. See Streeck, supra note 205, at 317, 327-28.
268. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text (discussing the European
Union's general framework Directive).
269. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 225, at 43-45 (discussing the desirability of Aus-
tralia adopting a works councils form of employee participation similar to that used in
western Europe). See also Blanpain, supra note 199, at XV (discussing the growth of
works councils systems as a response to declining union power).
270. See generally REICH, supra note 77, at 113-22, 263-64 (describing the sig-
nificant mobility of capital in the new global economy); SILVER, supra note 77, at 3-4
(summarizing studies discussing the "hypermobility" of capital in the global market-
place); Bellace, supra note 77, at 22 (noting the greater mobility of capital as com-
pared to labor in the global economy).
271. See SILVER, supra note 77, at 3-4 (summarizing various studies discussing a
race to the bottom in terms of labor power and governmental regulation in the global
economy); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 78, at 25 ("The problem of course is that the
increased mobility of capital in a global economy undermines the ability of individual
nation-states to regulate employers. If a country regulates the employment relation-
ship in such a way as to impose costs on capital, this gives the employer incentive to
move his operations to a country that does not impose such costs. As a result coun-
tries have incentive to minimize their regulations of employers, a result known as 'the
race to the bottom."').
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American labor and employment law is far less protective than in other indus-
trialized countries. 2 Interestingly, while the United States cooperates in
establishing international norms for trade, it has steadfastly declined to do the
same with respect to labor and employment norms,273 openly rejecting and
failing to comply with a number of international standards formulated by the
International Labor Organization.274 But, it is increasingly difficult to justify
the fairness of American business having an advantage in global economic
competition by virtue of social policies that fall below international standards.
The advent of a global marketplace calls for global labor standards. What is
needed is not a further race to the bottom, but a new international consensus
on labor policies that corrects the current lack of equilibrium in the relation-
ship between labor and capital.2 " An American Works Councils Act would
be a significant step in that direction.
C. Countervailing Considerations
While works councils mirror the type of employee involvement plan that
most workers desire, gaining the support of either management or unions for
such a system will be difficult.276 Both tend to oppose a works councils sys-
tem, albeit for different reasons.
277
272. The United States, for example, virtually stands alone among industrialized
nations in failing to provide general statutory protection against unjust dismissals.
See generally Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws in Other Countries: Some
Cautionary Notes, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 286, 287-94 (1984) (summarizing em-
ployment security statutes in Canada, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Ja-
pan); B. Hepple, Flexibility and Security of Employment, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES, supra
note 78, at 277 (summarizing employment security statutes in worldwide industrial
market economies). In addition, few other advanced democratic societies condone the
degree of lawful employer opposition to union representation that pervades labor
relations in the United States. See Adams, supra note 89, at 94.
273. See OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 126, at 156-57 (noting that while "the
United States has been the major force articulating a direction and coordinating policy
among the major international [trade] agencies.., the US government has conspicu-
ously abrogated its responsibilities for strategic leadership in the area of workers'
rights and labor standards").
274. See Christopher R. Coxson, Comment, The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fun-
damental Principles and Rights at Work: Promoting Labor Law Reforms Through
the ILO as an Alternative to Imposing Coercive Trade Sanctions, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L.
469, 471 (1999) (noting that the United States has not ratified any of the four core
labor standards promulgated in the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and
Rights of Work and also fails fully to comply with them).
275. See Befort, supra note 47, at 422-24 (discussing the current lack of equilib-
rium between capital and labor in today's global economy).
276. See Estreicher, supra note 178, at 159 (noting the lack of a political constitu-
ency for the adoption of a works council system); Michael H. Gottesman, Whither
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1. Management Opposition
Some employers and commentators perceive mandatory works councils
as costly and cumbersome.278 They point out that such legislation would
impose costs on employers with respect to both the establishment and the
maintenance of such organizations. 279 Additional costs would result from a
lack of employer flexibility in being able to adjust employment practices
quickly in response to market conditions.
280
The evidence concerning the likely impact of works councils on produc-
tivity, however, is far from clear. Research, as discussed above, suggests that
employee involvement generally increases productivity and the economic
performance of the organization.28 Interviews with managers of European
firms who consult with works councils "overwhelmingly ...[report that]
they have important positive effects which in general make them a net benefit
to firms.",282 Freeman and Lazear, similarly, have demonstrated the likely
beneficial effect of European works councils through economic modeling.
28 3
On the other hand, empirical studies looking specifically at German works
councils find that they have little correlation with productivity, 284 except in
285smaller firms where the correlation is for a reduced level of productivity. 5
Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2807
(1991).
277. See Bellace, supra note 77, at 26 (noting that both management and unions
tend to oppose the adoption of a works council system).
278. See generally Carol D. Rasnic, Germany's Statutory Works Councils and
Employee Codetermination: A Model for the United States? 14 LoY. L. A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 275, 299-300 (1992) (criticizing works councils as impinging on manage-
ment prerogatives).
279. See Kaufman, supra note 177, at 541-42. Under the German works council
model, employers are responsible for financing the operations of works councils. See
Lutringer & Dichter, supra note 88, at 4-66 to 4-67.
280. See Addison, supra note 109, at 313; Kaufrnan, supra note 177, at 541-42.
281. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
282. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 51. Freeman and Rogers also state that
"managers widely report that councils facilitate communication with employees,
increase employee commitment and force advanced planning in areas that require
council consultation that improve managements own initiatives." Id
283. See Freeman & Lazear, supra note 199, at 27-28, 49.
284. Kaufman, supra note 177, at 541 (reporting that "mixed econometric evi-
dence exists that works councils in Germany promote productivity"); Addison, supra
note 109, at 322 (reporting that the empirical research shows "little evidence of any
positive impact of works councils on firm performance. Much of the evidence actu-
ally points in an opposite direction."). Streeck contends that the economic impact of
European works councils is hard to establish quantitatively because no comparison
sector exists in which works councils do not operate. See Streeck, supra note 205, at
343.
285. See Kaufman, supra note 177, at 541.
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While economic productivity should not be the sole gauge for measuring
the worth of a works councils system, 28 6 these financial concerns can be mol-
lified, at least in part, by two adjustments to the German model. First, the
potential drag on managerial speed and flexibility could be reduced by the
expedient of only requiring consultation without also requiring lengthy im-
passe procedures such as arbitration.287 Further, legislation could exempt
small employers, such as those with fewer than 50 employees, from the works
councils mandate.
288
Some critics also maintain that works councils are unlikely to succeed in
an American climate in which wage bargaining does not take place on a na-
tional level. 289 In countries where compensation is established on a nation-
wide or industry-wide basis, as in Germany, 290 wages are taken out of compe-
tition and that source of potential friction is removed from the works council
agenda. 29 1 But, when pay is established at the enterprise level, employers and
employees become natural competitors for a larger slice of the enterprise
292pie. In order to maintain a relatively cooperative playing field for works
councils in this latter environment, wages should not be a mandatory topic for
consultation in an American works councils system. 293 Instead, the topic of
wages should be reserved for management determination or, in a unionized
setting, for union/management negotiations.
Finally, some commentators object to a system of works councils, argu-
ing that one size does not fit all with respect to employee participation de-
294
vices. That is, while a works councils system may be an appropriate par-
286. See REINHOLD FAHLBECK, FLEXIBILISATION OF WORKING LIFE: POTENTIALS
AND CHALLENGES FOR LABOUR LAW, AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 12 (1998) (stat-
ing that, in addition to efficiency concerns, modem labor policy also should serve
other purposes such as ensuring equality of opportunity and fair treatment of work-
ers); OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 126, at 11-12 (stating that a properly functioning
employment system must balance the goal of economic efficiency with other goals
such as individual dignity, equality of opportunity, and collective participation).
287. See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
288. This is the threshold adopted in the European Union's General Framework
Directive, supra note 217 and accompanying text, the Dutch Works Constitution Act,
see Taco van Peijpe, Independent Contractors and Protected Workers in Dutch Law,
21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 127, 134 (1999), as well as in the United States' Family
and Medical Leave Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 261 l(4)(A)(i) (2000).
289. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 61.
290. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
291. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 61; Kaufman, supra note 177, at
544.
292. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 62-63.
293. See id. at 62-63 (stating that "[w]e regard decentralized wage bargaining by
councils as undesirable because ... councils should be a device to enable labor and
management to increase enterprise surplus, not to fight over their respective shares,
and this requires a separation of these two activities").
294. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 178, at 160.
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ticipation mechanism in some settings, other participatory devices may be
superior in other settings. These commentators conclude, accordingly, that
employers should retain the discretion to select the most appropriate type of
program for the particular circumstances.
295
Beyond the fact that this solution more often than not results in little or
no participation, this criticism erroneously perceives the nature of works
councils. A works councils system operates as a portal to the realm of par-
ticipation as opposed to an exclusive participatory device. Discussions be-
tween management and works councils in Europe frequently spawn addi-
tional participatory arrangements. 296 As Wolfgang Streeck has noted, Euro-
pean works councils "may sustain a 'cooperative culture' within which ex-
perimentation with decentralized organizational structures can flourish. 297
2. Labor Opposition
Union supporters also find much to dislike in works councils and other
employee involvement plans.298 They perceive such programs as creating
sham organizations that inherently impede true collective bargaining.299 As
former UAW President Douglas A. Fraser stated in his dissent to the Dunlop
Commission's majority position on this issue, the kind of participation and
cooperation that the American system really needs "is democratic participa-
tion and cooperation between equals."300 In other words, America needs in-
dependent unions, not employer-dominated participation schemes.
I believe that union supporters are shortsighted in opposing legislation
establishing works councils. Unlike other employee involvement mecha-
nisms, employers cannot manipulate the creation of mandatory works coun-
cils to deter a union organizing drive.301 Works councils, moreover, involve
295. Id.
296. See Mfiller-Jentsch, supra note 228, at 69-70; Streeck, supra note 205, at
345.
297. Streeck, supra note 205, at 345.
298. For a discussion of union views on works councils as a specific sub-type of
EPP, see Freeman & Rogers, supra note 28, at 50.
299. See, e.g., Laurence Gold, The Legal Status of "Employee Participation"
Programs After the NLRB 's Electromation and du Pont Decisions, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
46TH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, JUNE 2, 1993, at 329, 346-51
(Bruno Stein ed., 1994); Michael C. Harper, The Continuing Relevance of Section
8(a)(2) to the Contemporary Workplace, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2322, 2375-76 (1998);
Owen E. Herrnstadt, Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA: The Debate, 48 LAB. L.J. 98
(1997); Martin, supra note 189, at 136-37.
300. REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 4, at
13.
301. Unlike most EPP plans which exist only at the discretion of management,
only workers can trigger the formation of a works council. See FACT FINDING
2004]
43
Befort: Befort:New Voice for the Workplace:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
MISSOURILAWREVIEW
collective action and likely will serve as seed beds for independent unions. 3
0 2
Workers who feel either empowered or thwarted by a works council experi-
ence may turn to independent unions to further their new-found collective
aspirations.
30 3
But even if I am wrong on this score, the argument that unions concep-
tually are a more desirable model of employee representation no longer pro-
vides a compelling basis for employee advocates to oppose works councils.
Union representation in the United States now stands at a mere thirteen per-
cent of the workforce and continues to drop.304 Stated conversely, the vast
majority of American workers have no representation rights at all. Under the
circumstances, some voice is better than no voice at all.
A related concern expressed by some commentators is that works coun-
cils work best in countries having a strong labor movement and may not be
transplantable to the United States where union density is so low.30 5 This is a
legitimate, but not fatal concern. There is some logic to the notion that em-
ployers will take works councils more seriously when their views are but-
tressed by a strong union ally. 30 6 This factor suggests that the adoption of an
American Works Councils Act should proceed in tandem with meaningful
labor law reform. 30 7 It does not mean, however, that the best available option
for enhancing employee voice should be abandoned simply because that
voice is not amplified as loudly as some may desire.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 43; WEILER, supra note 51, at 292; WEISS, supra note 228,
at 169.
302. See George Strauss, Is the New Deal System Collapsing? With What May it
be Replaced?, 34 INDUS. REL. 329, 340 (1995) (stating that institutions such as works
councils "might serve as way stations toward independent unions"); Estreicher, supra
note 41, at 29 (stating that works councils, if adopted in the United States, "are likely
to be seedbeds of traditional unionism, if they take hold at all").
303. See Alvin L. Goldman, Potential Refinements of Employment Relations Law
in the 21st Century, 3 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 269, 302 (1999) (stating that
"union leadership should recognize that works councils may be the best means for
providing the new American work force with object lessons in the value of collective
action as well as serve as a training ground to develop the core of rank and file leader-
ship needed for successful bargaining unit organizing"); see also Kaufman, supra
note 123, at 788-89.
304. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
305. See Bellace, supra note 227, at 460; Estreicher, supra note 41, at 29.
306. See Rogers, supra note 200, at 398-99 (stating that "councils inside the firm
work best when they enjoy some relation, however distanced, to a powerful union
movement outside it. The latter is a source of residual political support-including,
vitally, that needed to extract resources necessary to council functioning from em-
ployers or the state-and expertise in issues of council concern, from ergonomics to
new technologies, work organizations, or whatever.").
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CONCLUSION
American workers want and deserve a greater voice at work. Many
agree that the NLRA, in its current form, is not supportive of this goal. Most
of the reform proposals advanced by management and labor, however, are
inadequate to accomplish a broad-based and meaningful increase in employee
voice.
Most management proposals look to the East for a possible model.
They seek to replicate the employer-initiated EPPs that are prevalent in Japan
through a full or partial repeal of Section 8(a)(2). While EPPs produce posi-
tive results where properly structured, this route falls short of providing a
systemic solution to the problem of insufficient employee voice. Even if the
Section 8(a)(2) bar is removed, more employee voice will result only if indi-
vidual employers choose that result. Under such an approach, individual
employers would have full discretion to decide whether to create an EPP,
what form and functions it would take, and for how long it would continue to
exist. Given our current experience, there is reason to believe that American
employers will not exercise this discretion in a manner that broadly effectu-
ates employee voice.
Union proposals inevitably call for broad reform of the NLRA as a
means of revitalizing the shrinking American labor movement. While such
reform is badly needed, it too would fail as a systemic remedy. A leveling of
the labor law playing field would promote fundamental fairness and boost
union density, but it would not provide voice to most workers.
This article suggests that we turn to another direction and to another
model. The works councils system that is burgeoning in Europe enhances
employee voice through a readily accessible, representative institution that
consults with employers in a "spirit of cooperation." This institution closely
resembles the type of organization that, according to Freeman and Rogers,
most American workers want. The adoption of an American Works Councils
Act would not only close the representation/participation gap, but also would
link the United States and Europe in effectively establishing what hopefully
would be the first of many new global labor norms.
A significant number of Americans would like to see a return to an era
in which a strong union movement provided a forceful voice for American
workers. But, this is not in the cards. The global economy will continue to
squeeze unions for the foreseeable future with or without labor law reform.
In this climate, some voice is better than no voice at all. Or, to paraphrase
Mick Jagger one more time, even if you can't always get what you want; if
you try sometimes, you just might find, you get what you need.308
308. THE ROLLING STONES, You Can't Always Get What You Want, on LET IT
BLEED (ABKCO Records 1969).
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